
WASHINGTON (HUNS) — Damon Landor, a Rastafarian who had taken a Nazarite vow to grow his hair in locks, was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center for the final three weeks of his sentence. He arrived with proof of religious accommodation from two previous facilities, along with a court ruling showing that Louisiana recognized his practice under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).
A guard discarded Landor’s documents and called in the prison’s warden, Marcus Myers. When Myers asked to see additional proof of Landor’s religion, he no longer had it, and two guards carried him to another room, handcuffed him to a chair, and shaved his head.
After completing his sentence, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections, the prison, Myers, and the department’s secretary, James LeBlanc, in both their official and individual capacities. Twenty-two organizations, including religious groups, former correctional officers, and the United States, filed amicus briefs supporting him.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments Nov. 10 in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections to determine whether individuals may sue state officials for monetary damages over RLUIPA violations. Louisiana argues that individual-capacity claims are barred. Landor’s attorney, Zachary Tripp, countered that RLUIPA clearly allows “appropriate relief,” which includes damages.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett questioned whether that clarity exists, noting that both the district court and the 5th Circuit sided with the officials before appeal. Tripp argued that the law holds the government, and individuals acting on its behalf, responsible for violations.
Joshua McDaniel, director of Harvard Law School’s Religious Freedom Clinic, which filed a brief supporting Landor, said the official-capacity claims will likely be dismissed because previous Supreme Court precedent shields states and state officials in their official capacity from damages.
But, he said, the allegations remain serious. “No one can deny that this is a really egregious violation of the law and also an instance of prison guards thumbing their nose at a binding court precedent,” McDaniel said.
Because Landor is no longer incarcerated, he cannot seek injunctive relief. “The only remaining remedy he could possibly get would be the individual-capacity damages remedy,” McDaniel said. Without it, he added, most incarcerated people whose religious rights are violated would be left without any recourse.
Steven McFarland, director of the Christian Legal Society’s Center for Law and Religious Freedom, agreed. “If the warden and officers here are not individually liable for their grotesque violations of Mr. Landor’s rights, then the federal law at issue is functionally toothless,” he said. “If the state’s argument wins, then there is no remedy.”
Louisiana’s attorney, Benjamin Aguinaga, argued that officers cannot be sued for damages because they do not personally receive federal funding and therefore did not have notice they could face liability. Tripp responded that prisons receive federal funds, must comply with RLUIPA to accept them, and operate only through their officials. Former correctional officers filing briefs in support of Landor agreed that they understood they could be sued individually when violating federal law.
“If officials aren’t held liable, this federal law is functionally toothless.”
Chief Justice John Roberts questioned whether prison guards are actually aware of federal funding conditions when they are hired. Tripp replied that officers receive training on federal legal requirements.
Observers noted mixed reactions from the Court. McDaniel said the conservative justices showed more skepticism, while the liberal justices appeared supportive.
Meredith Holland Kessler of the Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Clinic said the questioning suggested that Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Kagan backed Landor’s position, while the conservative justices seemed doubtful. Still, she said, it was significant that the Court chose to hear the case at all, given that lower courts had ruled against Landor.
Support from a diverse coalition, including Jewish, Christian and Muslim organizations, also signals the potential importance of the ruling. Kessler said the number of parties backing Landor shows the stakes involved.
A ruling in favor of Landor, McFarland said, would mean incarcerated people retain meaningful protection of religious freedom as Congress intended. “If Mr. Landor loses, then wardens and state prison officers can violate federal law with impunity,” he said, arguing that the behavior described in Landor’s case undermines rehabilitation and public safety.
Daren Zhang, an attorney for former correctional officials, said the decision could correct an imbalance between federal and state prisons. Federal prison officials can already be sued for religious freedom violations; state officials cannot if Louisiana prevails. “Those state prisoners will continue to suffer from religious violations that have no recourse,” Zhang said.
Kessler noted the Court could also issue a narrower ruling. If the Court finds Congress did not state clearly enough that RLUIPA authorizes damages, it may invite Congress to clarify the statute. A ruling that Congress lacks authority to authorize such damages would be more limiting but could push states toward stronger protections.
Why do some prisons enforce hair-cutting policies at all? Correctional officials often cite security concerns, fear that inmates may hide contraband or change their appearance. But the Supreme Court already rejected overly broad grooming restrictions in Holt v. Hobbs, a 2015 case involving a Muslim prisoner seeking to grow a short beard. McDaniel said prisons often claim safety justifications but apply them rigidly, even when they conflict with established religious rights.
This piece first appeared in the Howard University News Service. It has been edited for style and length, and is being published with permission. For more information, visit HUNewsService.com.
